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Abstract 
As an implication of the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia, the authority to 
manage income and spending autonomously by local governments in Indonesia is 
undeniable. However, the power should be managed and used proportionally. The central 
government should not lose its control of the local governments, while the local 
governments maintain the authority to manage its area. This paper examines the 
proportions of the fiscal authority given by the central government to the local 
governments in Indonesia. In short, this research finds that in general, the framework of 
fiscal decentralization in Indonesia is going well. Some research also offers positive 
findings of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. However, there are also some serious 
problems resulting from the implementation of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia, such 
as vertical fiscal imbalance and corruption. These problems need to be reduced by issuing 
technical and specific regulations and by ensuring that those regulations are both 
monitored and implemented. 
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Abstrak 
Sebagai sebuah implikasi dari pelaksanaan desentralisasi di Indonesia, wewenang untuk 
mengelola pendapatan dan pembelanjaan secara mandiri oleh pemerintah daerah di 
Indonesia tidak bisa terelakkan. Namun, kewenangan tersebut harus dikelola dan 
digunakan secara proporsional. Pemerintah pusat seharusnya tidak kehilangan 
kontrolnya terhadap pemerintah daerah, sementara pemerintah daerah dapat 
mempertahankan otoritas untuk mengelola wilayahnya. Makalah ini mengkaji proporsi 
otoritas fiskal yang diberikan oleh pemerintah pusat kepada pemerintah daerah di 
Indonesia. Singkatnya, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa secara umum kerangka 
desentralisasi fiskal di Indonesia berjalan dengan baik. Beberapa penelitian juga 
menawarkan temuan positif tentang desentralisasi fiskal di Indonesia. Namun, ada juga 
beberapa masalah serius yang dihasilkan dari pelaksanaan desentralisasi fiskal di 
Indonesia, seperti ketidakseimbangan fiskal vertikal dan korupsi. Masalah-masalah ini 
perlu dikurangi dengan mengeluarkan peraturan teknis dan spesifik dan dengan 
memastikan bahwa peraturan-peraturan tersebut dapat dipantau dan 
diimplementasikan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As an implication of the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia, the 
authority to manage income and spending autonomously by local governments in 
Indonesia is undeniable. The authority, commonly called fiscal decentralization, becomes 
an integral part of the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia since it changes 
the power pendulum that was once centralized in the central government into the local 
governments.  
Fiscal decentralization in general means budgetary authority, such as making 
decisions of revenues and expenditures, being given to local governments/sub-national 
governments (SNGs) by a central government (Bahl, 2008). Porcelli (2009) refers to this 
system as decentralizing income and spending being implemented to empower SNGs. 
The argument from Porcelli above is likely giving the explanation that decentralization is 
not only a matter of power transfer but also a matter of empowerment. The explanation 
is in line with the research from Fedelino and Ter-Minassian (2009) that the objectives of 
fiscal decentralization are a state's stabilization, equalization of services and efficient 
allocation of funding.   
However, in order to empower at the SNG level, central government needs to 
consider the potential risks of the given authority to SNG, because it could destroy the 
decentralized system itself (Ahmad & Tanzi, 2002). The arrangements of fiscal 
decentralization ought to be granted by the central government in balanced proportions. 
The proportion means the central government does not lose its control of SNG, while the 
SNG maintains the authority to manage its area.  
In order to study the proportions of the authority given by the central government 
to SNG, this paper analyses the system of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. Indonesia 
is chosen because the country has been implementing decentralization for more than a 
decade. Furthermore, "Big Bang" decentralization in Indonesia (Hofman & Kaiser, 2002) 
allowed fiscal decentralization to become deeply implemented in this country (de Mello, 
2010).   
METHODOLOGY 
This research is a desk-based research that focuses on the investigation of the 
arrangement of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. In order to base the arguments, the 
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research uses secondary data, such as books, journals, acts, and some governmental 
publications. Case study approach is also utilized in this research in order to explore 
deeply about fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. The case study is based on the dynamics 
of citizen participation in the government in Indonesia and how the parliament works in 
order to aspire people’s voices. This research is divided into two part of the discussions. 
First, the system of fiscal decentralization, namely the power given by the central 
government to SNG, the systems of SNG grants and taxes in Indonesia, is analyzed by 
using a particular framework. Then, whether the concept and practice of fiscal 
decentralization in Indonesia are good or bad, based on the findings presented above, is 
considered. 
THE FINANCIAL POWER GIVEN BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT  
In order to assess fiscal decentralization in a particular country, Boschmann 
(2009) introduces a framework of fiscal decentralization that contains two main points: 
income assignments and spending assignments. This framework guides this examination 
of the fiscal power that has been decentralized to SNGs in Indonesia.  
Expenditure Assignments 
Carefully defining who has the responsibilities to expend the budget, in both 
central and local government, is important in order to establish financial accountability 
and avoid overlapping and redundancy (Boschmann, 2009). Thus, decentralization needs 
a legal framework to set both expenditure and income assignments. Boschmann (2009) 
suggested that legal framework informing, for example, revenue and spending regulations 
is needed to achieve the aims of fiscal decentralization. Related to Boschmann’s idea, 
fiscal decentralization in Indonesia is regulated by a particular law that has been changed 
twice. The first regulation of decentralization in Indonesia is Law No. 22/1999 on Local 
Government and then revised to become Law  No. 32/2004 on Local Government. In 
order to improve implementing decentralization in Indonesia, the regulation has recently 
changed to Law  No. 32/2004 on Local Government. The regulation contains several 
regulations related to fiscal activity in Indonesia's decentralized governments.  
Related to spending assignments, Article 298 of Law No. 23/2014 on Local 
Government reveals that a SNG has the right to spend its budget to provide basic services 
and to address the selective sector. Basic services consist of public health, food security, 
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basic education, public works, transportation; whereas agriculture, manufacture, trade, 
tourism, and fishery are examples of the elective sector (Law 23 No. 23/2014 on Local 
Government; Prasetiamartati, 2013). However, there are six functions, based on Article 
10, Law No. 23/2014 on Local Government, that are not decentralized to SNGs: foreign 
affairs, defense, police, justice, monetary and national fiscal issues, and religious affairs. 
This classification of the function is important to fit and benefit the SNG in order to 
deliver public services, while the central government focuses on conceptualizing state 
policies to make general regulation and to control the implementation of fiscal 
decentralization in local government (Boschmann, 2009). By having spending authority 
as mentioned in the law above, SNGs tend to facilitate better regional economic growth 
(Hariyanto, 2012). This finding is strengthened by the fiscal policy in Indonesia to 
guarantee the funds from the central government will not decrease from the previous year. 
Thus, it allows SNG to spend more money to enhance public services. 
However, spending authority in local government tends to encourage the abuse of 
power, such as ‘marking up'; when the SNGs try to unofficially inflate their real spending 
(Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2006 cited by the Directorate General of Budget, 2007). 
Presidential Order Number 70, the Year 2012, on Procurement and Services seems to 
have stimulated this bad behavior by allowing SNGs to choose regional projects' winners 
by direct appointment; by-passing the open tender procedure. Although the spending 
system of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia is well covered by clear regulations 
(Thomas et al., 2014; Law 23, the Year 2014, on Local Government), the specific 
regulation in SNG's spending needs to be developed to combat corruption cases, such as 
‘marking up'. 
Income Assignments 
Income assignments refer to what kind of revenues should be decentralized 
(Boschmann, 2009). Boschmann also suggested that, in consequence of fiscal 
decentralization, SNGs should control their own incomes. Article 279, Paragraph (2), 
Law No. 23/2014, on Local Government reveals that there are four financial powers that 
are given by the central government to SNGs in Indonesia. First, SNGs have an authority 
to get their own revenue from certain resources, such as local taxes and local levies. The 
local revenue is then shared between SNG and central government, commonly called the 
Revenue-Sharing Fund (Dana Bagi Hasil/DBH). The Public Expenditure and Financial 
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Accountability (PEFA) report in Indonesia (2012) reveals that DBH contributes almost a 
quarter of total revenue in SNGs (Thomas et al., 2014). 
Second, SNGs have the right to obtain certain funds; commonly called 
equalization, or balancing funds from central government's general allocation fund (Dana 
Alokasi Umum/DAU), special allocation fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus/DAK) and DBH. 
The 2012 PEFA report, for Indonesia, explains that more than half of total SNGs' funding 
comes from DAU, while DAK is the lowest proportion of balancing fund for local 
governments at 6.4 percent (Thomas et al., 2014). The results of the report are confirmed 
by other research that finds the revenue of SNG is dominated by funds from central 
government or DAU (German Development Institute, 2007 cited in Boschmann, 2009). 
Such conclusions suggest that SNG in Indonesia rely strongly on DAU. They also reveal 
that most spending on state revenues (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara/APBN) 
comes from the transfer of budget funds to the SNGs (Thomas, et al., 2014).  
Third, the central government has to fund the implementation of special autonomy 
for certain specified regions and fund for adjustments, such as via the incentives fund 
(Dana Insentif).  The 2012 PEFA report in Indonesia revealed that the amount of the 
special autonomy fund and the adjustment fund provided by central government 
depended on the performance of the SNGs (Thomas et al., 2014). The SNGs which have 
good audit-reports will receive extra funds. 
Lastly, the SNGs have a right to borrow money from any sources, such as central 
government, other SNGs, banks and private citizens (Article 300, Law No. 23/2014, on 
Local Government). However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned SNGs to 
avoid excessive debt in order to establish fiscal stability (Fedelino and Ter-Minassian, 
2009). For that reason, the central government in Indonesia has tight regulations in order 
to prevent the adverse impact of over-borrowing in SNGs. The upper limit of accumulated 
deficits to be paid by local loans is 0.3 percent of total gross domestic product (GDP); for 
annual deficits of SNGs, the maximum for loans is 4.5 percent of total GDP (Thomas et 
al., 2014). 
Analysis of the Fiscal Power in Local Government 
Overall, Law No. 23/2014 on Local Government tends to be comprehensive, 
regulating fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. Sections four and eleven of the above law 
clearly explains grants given by the central government, together with details of the 
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process of intergovernmental transfer. The comprehensiveness of information and 
regulations relevant to the fiscal decentralization gains Indonesia an A score, which is the 
highest score by PEFA in 2012 (Thomas et al., 2014). 
However, in spite of clear revenue and spending assignments in Indonesia's SNGs 
as mentioned above, there are some abuses of power related to fiscal decentralization in 
Indonesia. The Ministry of Finance, as cited in Kompas (2015), a national Indonesian 
newspaper, reveals that the most common corruption cases in SNG are related to abusing 
financial authority, pertaining to budgeting, taxes, levies, procurements, and grants. The 
cases happen because of the vulnerability of the SNG's bureaucracy when confronted by 
the strong interests of local individuals or groups (Kompas, 2015). Therefore, the 
bureaucratic system in Indonesia's SNGs needs to be improved, in order to enhance the 
untainted implementation of fiscal decentralization. 
THE SYSTEM OF GRANTS 
 In this section, every type of transfer, such as DAU, DAK and DBH is examined 
using some points introduced by the World Bank (2010); namely the definition, the aims 
and the methods of grants’ transfers. Generally speaking, the intergovernmental transfer 
system in Indonesia is formula based (Bappenas, 2011); the system of allocating grants 
based on each region’s condition (Boschmann, 2009). 
The General Allocation Fund 
DAU is an unconditional grant where the fund given by central government can 
be granted to SNG without any requirements and which can be freely used (World Bank, 
2010). The World Bank (2010) reveals that this grant is also defined as an equalization 
grant; as mentioned above because it is used in that capacity among SNGs. It means that 
the total amount of budget given by the central government is different from region to 
region; depending on each region's capacity. Article 290, Law No. 23/2014 on Local 
Government mentions that the total amount of DAU granted is based on the margin 
budget needed between a region's capacity/revenue and the fiscal needs in that region. 
The total amount of DAU has increased by approximately 14 percent per year, showing 
that DAU is an important grant in Indonesia, particularly for solving horizontal 
inequalities among regions (World Bank, 2010).  
Jurnal Transformative, Vol. 4, Nomor 2, September 2018 
85 
 
However, the World Bank (2010) noted that the problem of transfer grants in 
Indonesia is caused by a mismatch between actual revenues and expenditures for all levels 
of government; commonly called a vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) (Ruggeri et al., 1993). 
In 2008, based on VFI calculations, the financial condition in Indonesia's central 
government was a deficit, while SNGs were in surplus (World Bank, 2010). This 
condition resulted from the allocation of some funds by the central government to SNGs, 
although the functions to finance some policies had been delegated to SNGs (World Bank, 
2010). Thus, despite allowing SNGs to fund their policies using the budget granted, the 
central government is still financing affairs that are now the responsibility of regional 
authorities. The problem can be solved by identifying and revising financial policies in 
Indonesia, when and where necessary, to make clearer the responsibilities among 
different level governments. 
The Special Allocation Fund 
 Based on Article 41, Law No. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance, the SNG which receives 
DAK has to provide matching funds up to at least 10 percent of the total allocation of 
DAK. Therefore, DAK is included as a matching grant (World Bank, 2010); a grant given 
by the central government to a SNG, accompanied by conditional regulations, such as a 
funding contribution from SNG (World Bank, 2001). Article 40, Law No. 33/ 2004, on 
Fiscal Balance reveals that the total amount of DAK is based on criteria considering the 
ability and probity of finance in various SNGs. 
 The research from Lewis (2013) finds that DAK is the significant fund for 
stimulating some expenditure of capital. The most influential DAK’s fund to stimulate 
the capital spending is in the education and health sectors (Lewis, 2013). However, 
although DAK has narrowed the fiscal gap among SNGs, the monitoring guidance of 
DAK’s impact among different level governments is not properly provided in Indonesia 
(Bappenas, 2011). This condition makes the impact of any intergovernmental transfer 
systems difficult to research.  
Revenue-Sharing Transfers 
DBH is the fund that is allocated from a certain income of APBN to reduce the 
financial imbalance between central government and the SNGs (Article 1, Paragraph 49, 
Law of the Republic of Indonesia 23, the Year 2014, on Local Government). The income 
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of DBH comes from taxes and non-taxes. Taking an important role to guarantee the level 
of decentralization, DBH is included as an unconditional grant where the SNGs can use 
the fund unconditionally (World Bank, 2010). In this part, the author has focused on the 
system of non-taxes, because the system of taxes is examined in the next section.   
The most revenue from non-taxes in Indonesia comes from exploiting natural 
resources by totaling $17 billion (Thomas et al., 2014). The process of exploiting natural 
resources is usually carried out by SNGs because members of SNGs know better about 
the real condition in their area. This authority is strengthened by Article 289, Paragraph 
(4), Law No. 23/2014, on Local Government, that reveals SNGs have some authority to 
exploit natural resources, such as license fees of forest utilization or exploitation.   
However, the authority emerging from decentralization tends to be improperly 
used by some SNG leaders. At the end of the year 2015, Indonesia suffered from 
widespread haze caused by forest fires, especially in some regions of Kalimantan and 
Sumatra (BBC, 2015). The disaster is caused by excessive deforestation to establish palm 
oil plantations by companies given permits to cut down the trees by SNG (Edwards, 
2015). According to Edwards (2015), the permit is easily given because the SNG leaders 
have an unofficial agreement with the owner of the palm oil companies, in which the 
companies get new plantations and local leaders receive illegal payments. In conclusion, 
although the regions have the authority to gain money from exploiting their natural 
resources, in some cases that authority is used to benefit the decision makers, rather than 
delivering better services to the local community.  
SYSTEM OF TAXES 
 Based on Articles 281 and 289 of Law No. 23/2014, on Local Government, local 
taxes are included as DBH in which the SNGs have the authority to collect revenue from 
some taxes locally and share it with central government by a specific proportion. 
Bappenas (2011) explains that the amount of the local tax rate is determined by each 
SNG. According to the Directorate General of Tax (2012), there are some taxes that are 
levied by SNGs; for example vehicle tax, company or business tax and parking tax. The 
proportion of profit sharing from taxes is different for every type of tax. For example, 
SNG has 12 percent of the profit from income tax, while 90 percent profit is given to the 
local government in property tax (Directorate General of Financial Balance, 2012). The 
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different proportions depending on who has the responsibility to collect such taxes. The 
World Bank (2010) explains that the central government taxes tend to give a smaller 
proportion to SNG, while the local taxes tend to give the highest proportion to the SNGs. 
There are two important aspects of the tax systems that influence whether the local taxes 
are good or bad; namely accountability and impact of local revenue (Bahl, 2008). 
Accountability of local taxes revenue in Indonesia depends on political will in 
every SNG. In the Explanatory Provision of Article 262, Law No. 23/2014, on Local 
Government, it stipulates that a SNG has to give an annual report and information needed 
to by citizens to ensure transparency in SNG; but without providing comprehensive 
regulations to make local taxes accountable. The accountability of local taxes is 
commonly unnoticed because people tend to think that the benefit of a grant is greater 
than from local tax; therefore people tend to pay little or no attention to local taxes (Bahl, 
2008). This situation reveals that accountability in local taxes is not a government priority. 
However, the city of Surabaya implements online local taxes, where people can access 
the information regarding their local taxes and can pay their local taxes by using the 
Internet (Revenue Agency of Surabaya, 2012). The policy makes local taxes accountable 
and transparent because people can freely access the information of allocation of local 
taxes and the local taxes' impact in developing the region; transparency is both established 
and maintained. Thus, although accountability of local taxes depends on the political will 
from each SNG, the central government ought to provide a stricter set of regulations to 
ensure the management of local taxes is accountable. 
Related to the increasing regional revenue from tax collecting, Bahl (2008) 
explained that generally, local taxes make little impact in mobilizing SNGs' overall 
revenues because SNGs rely on fund transfers from central government, such as DAU. 
However, the World Bank (2010) revealed that the SNGs are getting benefits of sharing 
revenue from taxes in Indonesia, especially property taxes, which are continuously 
increasing year on year. The condition is caused by a lump-sum system of sharing, where 
every SNG has the same proportion of taxes’ income. Eventually, this helps SNGs which 
have smaller populations to get revenue from property tax as much as from other, more 
populous SNGs.  
However, the capacity for collecting local taxes could hinder the overall system 
of local taxes (Kurniawan, 2009). CNN Indonesia (2015) reported that there are some 
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civil servants in the tax agency in Jakarta who were arrested by police as a result of 
stealing taxes. In addition, Lewis (2006) revealed that the lack of efficiency in managing 
local taxes makes more than half of the revenue used for administrative only. The 
condition can decrease the income from local taxes and impacts on delivering public 
services in SNGs. Therefore, the local taxes potentially increase regions' revenues, but 
tax collection needs a tight, well-ordered system to make both the process and the revenue 
appear transparent. 
OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
Based on the evidence, research and findings presented above, in general 
Indonesia has a good enough framework of fiscal decentralization. Every aspect of the 
policy is trying to be regulated by a specific regulation. Some international reports where 
Indonesia managed to get a satisfactory score in several aspects of fiscal decentralization 
are evidence that Indonesia is serious in improving the decentralization system. 
Nevertheless, oligarchic politics, corruption and very dependent on central 
government's funds are still the main problems of the implementation of fiscal 
decentralization in Indonesia. Irresponsible officials try to find loopholes so that fiscal 
decentralization provides group or personal benefits for them. Some of those use 
regulation to back their action. For example, the funds transferred from the central 
government in the fiscal year should not be left over. If the funds are left over, then the 
next fiscal year funds from the central government will be reduced by the assumption that 
the local government has not been able to use and absorb the budget. The regulation is 
used by those irresponsible officials to spend the funds in various ways, one of which is 
by holding fictitious activities (see Nailufar, 2017; Tanjung 2018). The action, of course, 
is a form of corruption. 
Therefore, some progressive action from the central government is needed to 
solve the problems. One of the ways is by issuing technical and specific regulations on 
fiscal decentralization. Derivative regulations on fiscal decentralization must be regulated 
in detail. Furthermore, the regulations need to be focused on the outcome of the policy 
rather than just output. Rewards and punishments on the use of the funds by local 
governments can also be considered. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Having general regulations informing every aspect of fiscal decentralization 
indicates Indonesia has a good framework for implementing that decentralization. Some 
research also offers positive findings of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. However, 
there are also some serious problems resulting from the implementation of fiscal 
decentralization in Indonesia, such as vertical fiscal imbalance and corruption. These 
problems need to be reduced by issuing technical and specific regulations and by ensuring 
that those regulations are both monitored and implemented. 
 
REFERENCES  
Ahmad, E. and Tanzi, V. (eds) (2002) Managing Fiscal Decentralization. London and 
New York. Routledge 
Asril, S. (2015) Mendagri: 343 Kepala Daerah Tersangkut Kasus Hukum. Kompas 
[online]. 04 January. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/02/04/21114211/Mendagri.343.Kepala.
Daerah.Tersangkut.Kasus.Hukum> 
Bahl, R. (2008) The Pillars of Fiscal Decentralization [Online]. [Accessed: 12 January 
2016]. Retrieved from <http://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/257> 
Bappenas (2011) Analisis Perspektif, Permasalahan dan Dampak Dana Alokasi Khusus 
(DAK) [online]. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://kumoro.staff.ugm.ac.id/file_artikel/DAK_whitepaper.pdf> 
BBC (2015) Indonesia Haze: Child Evacuation Plan Prepared. BBC News [online]. 
[Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34612922> 
Boschmann, N. (2009) Fiscal Decentralization and Options for Donor Harmonization 
[online]. Porto-Novo: Development Partners Working Group on Local 
Governance and Decentralization. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://delog.org/cms/upload/pdf/Fiscal_Decentralisation.pdf> 
de Mello, L. (2010) Does Fiscal Decentralisation Strengthen Social Capital? Cross 
Country Evidence and the Experiences of Brazil and Indonesia [online]. 
Jurnal Transformative, Vol. 4, Nomor 2, September 2018 
90 
 
[Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/content/workingpaper/5km347ntdnxn-en> 
Directorate General of Budget (2007) Penggelembungan Anggaran Modus Laten Korupsi 
[online]. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://www.anggaran.depkeu.go.id/dja/edef-konten-view.asp?id=88> 
Directorate General of Financial Balance (2012) Dana Bagi Hasil Pajak [online]. 
[Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://www.djpk.kemenkeu.go.id/attachments/article/190/Leaflet_DBH_Pajak.
pdf> 
Directorate General of Tax (2012) Belajar Pajak [online]. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. 
Retrieved from <http://www.pajak.go.id/content/belajar-pajak> 
Edwards, S. (2015) Why Indonesia Can’t Stamp Out Fires That Have Cast A Haze Over 
South-East Asia [online]. The Conversation: Academic Rigour, Journalistic Flair, 
United Kingdom. [Accessed: 10 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<https://theconversation.com/why-indonesia-cant-stamp-out-fires-that-have-
cast-a-haze-over-south-east-asia-50029> 
Fedelino, A. and Ter-Minassian, T. (2009) Macro Policy Lessons for a Sound Design of 
Fiscal Decentralization [online]. Fiscal Affairs Department, Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/072709.pdf> 
Hariyanto D.T. (2012) Dampak Desentralisasi Fiskal Terhadap Pertumbuhan Ekonomi 
Daerah di Provinsi Jambi [online]. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://lib.ui.ac.id/file?file=digital/20298010-T30034-
Dampak%20desentralisasi.pdf> 
Hoffman, B. and Kaiser, K. (2002) The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath. Can 
Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia?. Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies, Georgia State University. 
Kurniawan, L. (2009) Isu dan Masalah Dalam Upaya Menggali Potensi Pajak/Retribusi 
Daerah dari Sektor Informal [online]. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved 
from <https://staff.blog.ui.ac.id/teguh1/files/2009/01/seminar_stks_tk.pdf> 
Law Number 22 the Year 1999 on Local Government 
Law Number 32 the Year 2004 on Local Government 
Jurnal Transformative, Vol. 4, Nomor 2, September 2018 
91 
 
Law Number 23 the Year 2014 on Local Government 
Law Number 33 the Year 2004 on Fiscal Balance 
Lewis, B.D. (2006) Local Government Taxation: An Analysis of Administrative Cost 
Inefficiency. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies [online], 42(2), pp.213-
233. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00074910600873666> 
Lewis, B.D (2013) Local Government Capital Spending in Indonesia: Impact of 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers [online]. Public Budgeting & Finance, 33(1), 
pp.76-94. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-
5850.2013.12002.x/abstract;jsessionid=FD00B01DAE9B427CDF24DEFE2370
0029.f01t03?userIsAuthenticated=false&deniedAccessCustomisedMessage> 
Nailufar, N.N. (2017) Dua Pejabat Kemenag Jadi Tersangka Kasus Rapat Fiktif. Kompas 
[online]. 31 August. [Accessed: 15 October 2018]. Retrieved from < 
https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2017/08/31/17172481/dua-pejabat-
kemenag-jadi-tersangka-kasus-rapat-fiktif> 
Porcelli, F. (2009) Fiscal Decentralisation and Efficiency of Government [online]. A brief 
literature review. Department of Economics. University of Warwick (UK). 
[Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.232.4919&rep=rep1
&type=pdf> 
Prasetiamartati B., (2013) Policy and Participatory Local Government in Indonesia. 
UNDP [online]. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/Democratic%20Governance/F
ederalism/International%20Conference%20Sept13/presentations/Day2/3rd%20
Ms.%20Budiati%20pdf.pdf> 
Pratama, A.B. (2015) Ahok Minta Dinas Pajak Pecat Pejabat Bermasalah. 16 December. 
CNN Indonesia [online]. [Accessed: 12 January 2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20151216142307-20-98625/ahok-
minta-dinas-pajak-pecat-pejabat-bermasalah/> 
Presidential Order Number 70 the Year 2012 on Procurement and Services 
Presidential Order Number 162 the Year 2014 on APBN's Details 
Jurnal Transformative, Vol. 4, Nomor 2, September 2018 
92 
 
Roy, J. (ed.) (1995) Macroeconomic Management and Fiscal Decentralization. World 
Bank Publications. 
Ruggeri, G.C., Howard, R. and VanWart, D. (1992) Structural Imbalances in the 
Canadian Fiscal System 
Tanjung, C.A. (2018) Perdana di 2018, Jaksa Tahan Tersangka Korupsi Alat Kantor 
Fiktif. Detik [online]. 16 January. [Accessed: 15 October 2018]. Retrieved from 
< https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3817915/perdana-di-2018-jaksa-tahan-
tersangka-korupsi-alat-kantor-fiktif> 
Thomas, T., Narula, R., Schmalhofer, C., Saleh, I., Siva, R., Sunaryadi, A., Purnomo, H., 
Ariadharma, E., Fallov, J.A., Harmawan, R.S., Suprayitno, U., Asra, N.K., 
Kusuma, I. G. N.W., Taylor, A., Fitrani, F., MacKenzie, S., Ahern, M., Sari, S.B., 
Sinaga, R., Tambunan, M., Ginting, E. (2014) Indonesia - Repeat Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Report and Performance 
Indicators [online]. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. [Accessed: 12 January 
2016]. Retrieved from < 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/12/23037288/indonesia-repeat-
public-expenditure-financial-accountability-pefa-report-performance-indicators 
> 
World Bank (2001) Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations [online]. [Accessed: 12 January 
2016]. Retrieved from 
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscal.htm#3> 
World Bank (2010) Laporan Penelitian Dana Transfer Pusat ke Daerah: 
Penyempurnaan Grand Design Desentralisasi Fiskal 2010 [online]. [Accessed: 
12 January 2016]. Retrieved from <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/05/11/
000020953_20120511104258/Rendered/PDF/687640ESW0P1190sfer0Pusat0ke
0Daerah.pdf> 
 
